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This version: May 2004Bogus Refugees? The Determinants 
of Asylum Migration to Western Europe 
 
This article analyses the determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe. Potential 
asylum seekers balance the costs of staying versus the costs of migrating. Estimation results 
confirm that economic hardship and economic discrimination against ethnic minorities lead 
to higher flows of asylum seekers. However, political oppression, human rights abuse, violent 
conflict and state failure are also important determinants. Migration networks and 
geographical proximity are important facilitators of asylum flows as predicted by theory. 
Colonial experience, religious similarity and casual contact with the developed world (aid, 
trade and tourism) are not. Natural disasters and famines are also not statistically significant 
determinants. These events are typically short-term and unexpected, whereas asylum 
migration to Western Europe requires preparatory planning. If Western European countries 
want to tackle the root causes of asylum migration, then they need to undertake policy 
measures that promote economic development, democracy, respect for human rights and 
peaceful conflict resolution in countries of origin. 
 
Asylum migration creates conflict within developed countries between natives and asylum 
seekers and it creates conflict between neighboring developed countries with one trying to 
pass the burden of migration to the other. Yet, even though the international flow of people 
has been on the agenda of international affairs for many years (Teitelbaum 1984), it is still an 
under-researched area of international relations relative to the flow of, say, trade and finance. 
This article looks at an important aspect of this international flow of people and analyses the 
following questions: What factors can explain asylum migration to Western European 
countries? We will analyze whether aggregate numbers of asylum seekers in Western 
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2 can be explained by economic factors only, as the widespread perception of asylum 
seekers as ‘bogus refugees’ would suggest, or whether aspects of political oppression, human 
rights abuse and generalized violence in the countries of origin also play an important role.
3 
This has important policy implications on what destination countries can do to tackle the root 
causes of asylum migration. 
The question of what makes an asylum seeker a ‘genuine’ refugee is of course already 
highly contentious (Robinson and Segrott, 2002). A refugee in the legal sense is defined in 
Article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as a person who ‘owing to 
a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and 
is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country…’. Such refugees enjoy the right of non-refoulement – the right not to be returned to 
their country of origin. This definition does not directly cover threats to one’s personal 
integrity from other causes, e.g., people fleeing from war, political violence not specifically 
directed against them, natural disasters, famine and the like. As Roberts notes, developed 
countries have always been against extending the formal definition of refugees, ‘no doubt 
because of a refusal to accept the consequent duty to provide asylum’ (Roberts, 1998:381). 
Nevertheless, because it is difficult to justify denying protection for these other ‘genuine’ 
refugees altogether, many more asylum applicants are de facto accepted as refugees and 
                                                 
2 We focus on Western Europe rather than other developed countries due to better data availability. 
3 Looking at recognition rates on asylum applications is no alternative to such analysis. Decreasing recognition 
rates could be the consequence of more restrictive recognition rules particularly with respect to the treatment of 
asylum applicants that are refugees in the wider sense, but that do not fulfil the restrictive legal definition of the 
1951 Convention. That such rates often vary substantially across destination countries (Neumayer, 2004b) and 
in federal jurisdictions like Switzerland even within one country suggests that it would be erroneous to simply 
look at these (Holzer, Schneider and Widmer, 2000a). 
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provided with the same rights as given to those granted asylum (UNHCR, 2000). 
Humanitarian concerns notwithstanding, all countries have used asylum policies partly to 
further their own interests. Politics and geography matter when it comes to asylum seekers. 
As long as they were mainly those fleeing from Eastern European Communist countries and 
coming in small numbers, the institution of asylum was little contested. On the contrary, such 
asylum seekers served to ‘embarrass and discredit adversary nations’ (Teitelbaum, 1984:430). 
Things changed in the 1970s and 1980s when asylum seekers were no longer the same as 
before: ‘they were increasingly third world in origin; they had less in common culturally with 
Europeans than previous asylum movements; and they arrived, often illegally, through the 
use of traffickers and/or false documentation’ (Hansen and King, 2000:400). Giving asylum 
to these people carries much less geopolitical reward to developed countries than did the 
welcoming of asylum seekers fleeing Communism. And of course numbers were also much 
higher than they used to be – see table 1. 
< Table 1 about here > 
All these factors led to a backlash and various attempts by Western European and other 
developed country governments to reduce the number of people lodging asylum applications. 
Such policy measures are often justified with recourse to the argument that ‘a rising number 
of applicants for asylum (…) are not in genuine need of protection’ (European Council, 
1992:1). When numbers of asylum seekers were at their maximum, calls for restricting the 
inflow even of ‘genuine’ refugees were not uncommon either. Western European countries 
have tried to restrict the increasing number of asylum seekers with the help of deterrence and 
deflection measures such as lists of ‘safe’ third countries and ‘safe’ origin countries to which 
asylum seekers could be sent back to, visa restrictions, airline sanctions and the like 
(Neumayer, 2004a). Little has been done to deal with the reasons why people seek asylum in 
3 
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seriously ways to reduce migration pressure by solving the causes of asylum migration rather 
than by merely keeping out unwanted asylum seekers from their borders (European Council, 
1999 and 2002). To engage in such policies more effectively, one must first of all know what 
are the major determinants of asylum migration. This article will identify the major 
determinants and thus provide guidance on which policies are needed to address the root 
causes of asylum migration. 
This article provides the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of the causes of asylum 
migration to Western Europe. Existing studies mainly address refugees crossing national 
boundaries and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the majority of which are located in 
developing countries.
4 A specific focus on asylum seeking in developed countries can be 
justified on a number of grounds. To start with, the rising number of migrants asking for 
asylum in developed countries, rather than the much higher number of refugees in developing 
countries has caught the attention of the public, media and policy makers alike and has 
resulted in various defensive policy measures aimed at reducing these numbers. Quantitative 
studies of the causes of refugee and IDP flows in developing countries suggest that human 
rights abuses and generalized political violence are important causes for refugee flight, but 
are they also causes of asylum seeking in developed countries? Given that asylum seekers in 
developed countries make up less than 30 per cent of worldwide refugees and IDPs 
(UNHCR, 2002), and are typically excluded from many refugee studies
5, it is unclear whether 
the same causes drive both phenomena. A priori, there might be good reasons to presume that 
the causes will be different. Indeed, the popular perception is that asylum seekers are mainly 
economic migrants and therefore ‘bogus’ rather than ‘genuine’ refugees. 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Schmeidl (1997), Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003), Moore and Shellman (2003). 
5 For example, Schmeidl (1997), Gibney, Apodaca and McCann (1996), Apodaca (1998). 
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Theoretical Considerations: What Makes People Seek Asylum? 
Much of the existing literature on the determinants of asylum seeking, or of migration more 
generally, distinguishes between factors pushing people out of their country of origin and 
factors pulling people towards the country of destination (see, for example, Schoorl, 2000)). 
Following Moore and Shellman (2003), we will conceptualize  the decision to lodge an 
application for asylum more directly as the consequence of utility maximizing behavior. An 
individual weighs the costs of staying in one’s country of origin versus the costs of migrating 
to the country of destination.
6 If the costs of staying exceed the costs of migrating, then the 
individual or in some cases the whole family, will decide to migrate and file an application 
for asylum. It is likely that this decision-making by asylum seekers is influenced by a 
complex range of mutually non-exclusive factors. Due to space limitations, we can only 
sketch these factors here. 
Before looking at these factors, it is important that our conceptualization should not be 
misinterpreted. The decision to migrate might well be undertaken under time and other 
pressure, but even in these cases a decision to leave the country is in effect taken.
7 We 
therefore also draw on insights from the general literature on voluntary migration,
8 fully 
aware that sometimes asylum seekers will have fled their country under imminent threat to 
their own personal integrity or that of their family. 
 
                                                 
6 Theorists of voluntary migration typically model migration within a benefit-cost framework. The two 
frameworks are fully compatible since the benefits of migration are nothing else but the opportunity costs of 
staying. 
7 Things are different where people are actively forced out of their country against their will, i.e. in spite of their 
decision to stay, but these are likely to cover a small minority of cases only. 
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As concerns socio-economic factors, the traditional neoclassical economic approach to 
migration emphasizes the importance of the relative difference in wage rates and rate of 
return to human capital in the destination and countries of origin as decisive factors in the 
international migration decision (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1994). Poor living standards and 
employment opportunities in the country of origin make it more attractive to seek 
improvement of one’s economic fortune abroad. They raise the benefits of migration and 
therefore the opportunity costs of staying behind. Human capital economic theory also 
predicts that people of working age are most likely to migrate as they have a higher chance to 
increase their living standards than others (Massey et al., 1993; Borjas, 1994). Importantly, 
migration that is mainly determined by an economic calculus might become channeled into 
asylum migration if other legal channels of migration become shut. This happened in the late 
1960s and 1970s when legal economic migration and family reunification with existing 
migrants became severely restricted in many Western European countries. 
Oppressive political conditions raise the costs of staying for all individuals, except those 
forming part of the oppressing political elite. Restrictions on the freedom to associate, to 
assemble, to voice dissident political opinions and to compete for political office can 
therefore be expected to be positively associated with asylum flows. The same holds true for 
any form of threat to the personal integrity of individuals. This threat could come from 
various sources. It could come from the government or government-controlled agencies in the 
form of human rights violations and the killing of political dissidents. A threat could also 
come from dissident groups, however, who use violence in their attempt to overthrow the 
existing political regime. In most cases, there will be a combination of threats from both 
government and dissident sides, most clearly visible in periods of civil war, often facilitated 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 As reviewed in, e.g., Massey et al. (1993) and Borjas (1994). 
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country in the case of an inter-state war. Lastly, geography reminds us that threats to one’s 
personal integrity can also come from the exposure of human beings to natural disasters such 
as earthquakes, floods and the like. The same is true for famines, which are often a 
consequence of the combination of adverse natural conditions with violent political conflict. 
Quite clearly, threats to one’s personal integrity significantly raise the costs of staying. Also, 
threats to personal integrity can go hand in hand with damage to the economic opportunities 
of affected individuals, thus reinforcing the socio-economic factors influencing the decision-
making. 
 
The Costs of Migration 
The costs of migration are normally high given that one leaves one’s familiar surroundings 
and culture and needs to adapt to new living conditions, possibly a new language and a 
different culture in the country of destination where the existing population might view 
immigrants with suspicion and hostility. As The Economist (2002:6) has put it: ‘Leaving 
one’s home to settle in a foreign land requires courage or desperation’. If only for this reason 
most people stay put rather than leave their country of origin. In addition, there are also the 
direct costs of migration in the form of transportation and information costs. Since fewer 
people in very impoverished countries will have the resources available to finance their 
migration, it is widely suggested that the effect of the level of economic development on 
migration could be bell-shaped, often referred to as a ‘migration hump’ (see, for example, 
Vogler and Rotte (2000), Holzer, Schneider and Casey (2002), Boswell (2003)). Great 
poverty might impede migration and little poverty takes away the incentives for migration. A 
similar argument can be made with respect to the political regime in the source country. 
Democratic countries restrict entry, but rarely exit of citizens, whereas harsh autocracies 
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therefore be bell-shaped as well. In harsh autocracies leaving the country is difficult, whereas 
full democracy takes away one incentive to leave. 
More generally, factors that facilitate the transition from one country to another will lower 
the costs of migration and therefore be associated with higher asylum flows. For example, 
cultural and religious similarity helps to reduce the costs of adjusting to the new country of 
destination. Similarly, the systems approach suggests that existing links and personal contacts 
between destination countries and the country of origin might also facilitate migration as they 
make individuals more familiar with the other country. Higher inflows of aid, trade or 
tourism might enhance such contacts (Bilsborrow and Zlotnik, 1994). Individuals from 
countries of origin which were colonized by Western developed countries in the past, might 
face lower costs of migration to these countries (Robinson and Segrott, 2002). This is because 
the former colonial power’s language is often spoken in the former colony as well. In 
addition, there are often long-term residents from former colonies living in the destination 
country who can help in finding jobs and who provide some cushioning of the cultural shock 
linked to migration to a foreign country. 
Similarly, according to network theory a higher number of past asylum seekers from a 
particular country of origin lowers the costs of migration for those left behind (Massey et al., 
1993; Koser and Pinkerton, 2002; Robinson and Segrott, 2002). This is because positive 
examples have been set that migration can be done, and more or less dubious businesses will 
have evolved to help in getting visas or arranging for transportation (traffickers). In addition, 
already existing asylum seekers might help newcomers in finding their way in the country of 
destination and in the search for employment. Immigrants tend to cluster spatially in order to 
lower the costs of migration. Destination countries often try to prevent such clustering 
without much success. 
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can be used, whereas great geographical distance to the country of destination raises the costs 
of migration as air transport is required. Since most refugees do not have the means to 
overcome great geographical distances they become IDPs, or refugees in neighboring 
developing countries rather than asylum seekers in the developed world. 
Finally, generous welfare provisions for asylum seekers lower the costs of migration 
(Robinson and Segrott, 2002). Conversely, deterring measures such as restrictions on welfare 
benefits and working rights, the risk of one’s application becoming rejected due to low 
recognition rates, limited appeal opportunities and the threat of forced removal all raise the 
costs of migration. Developed countries have gone a long way over the last decade or so to 
raise these costs of migration. Ironically, this meant that asylum seekers have resorted more 
to the help provided by traffickers (Koser, 2000), which is then regarded with great suspicion 
in the destination country (UNHCR, 2000). In addition, developed countries have also taken 
measures to prevent individuals from lodging asylum applications in the first place in the 
form of visa restrictions, sanctions against airlines bringing in passengers without valid visas 
and the like (Böcker and Havinga, 1998; Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Schuster, 2000; Noll, 
2000). They have not been worried by the fact that many of these restrictions indiscriminately 
raise the costs of migration for ‘genuine’ refugees and for those in search for improved 
economic living conditions, even though the measures are usually justified by the perceived 
need to deter only the latter (Steiner, 1999; Gibney, 2000). 
 
A Review of Quantitative Refugee and Asylum Migration Studies 
Given the political and social attention that the number of asylum seekers has attracted over 
the last decade or so, there is a surprising lack of quantitative analysis of the causes of these 
flows. There are more studies either looking at flows of refugees and IDPs in general, which 
9 
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developing countries. We start with a review of these studies before turning to the fewer 
existing studies of asylum migration to developed countries. 
Edmonston (1993) finds that threat of violence and, less clearly, low socioeconomic 
development explain the number of refugee emigrants per capita in 74 and 130 refugee-
generating and receiving countries in 1986 and 1990, respectively. Apodaca (1998) in her 
analysis of the relationship between human rights violations and refugee migration in 20 
selected developing countries over the period 1985 to 1994 similarly finds that such 
violations are strong predictors of consequent refugee flows. With the help of frequency 
tables, Gibney, Apodaca and McCann (1993) find that countries with gross human rights 
violations are those generating high numbers of both refugees and IDPs and that refugees 
tend to flee to countries with a better human rights record. Whilst providing interesting 
evidence, these studies have some limitations. One is that they are confined to a selection of 
countries, where refugee flows have actually taken place on a large scale. This can create 
sample selection bias. In addition, with the exception of Edmonston’s study they do not 
control for other determinants than human rights violations, which could result in omitted 
variable bias. 
Schmeidl (1997) provided one of the first multivariate quantitative analysis of the causes 
of refugees, which includes in principle all countries, not just those where people have been 
turned into refugees. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) in a panel covering the period 1971 
to 1990 she finds that events of ‘generalized violence’ are the main causes of refugees. 
Genocides/politicides
9, civil wars, particularly if coupled with external military intervention, 
and, once outliers are deleted, ethnic rebellion force people to migrate. The lagged stock of 
                                                 
9 These refer to the calculated physical destruction of a communal or political group in whole or part (Harff and 
Gurr, 1988). 
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significant. In contrast, she finds no evidence that the type of political regime as measured by 
the extent of political freedom matters. The same is true for economic hardship or poverty as 
proxied by per capita energy consumption as well as population pressure as proxied by 
population density. She also finds no robust evidence that external or interstate wars matter. 
As an explanation for the striking difference between civil and interstate war she suggests 
that ‘if we assume that refugees flee from where the shooting comes from, internal 
displacement should be more likely than external flight, since interstate wars are often most 
intense in border regions’ (Schmeidl, 1997:304). 
Many of Schmeidl’s results are confirmed by a similar study undertaken by Davenport, 
Moore and Poe (2003) of forced migration over the period 1964 to 1989. Unlike Schmeidl 
(1997), they include both refugees and IDPs. Given that the search is for the determinants of 
forced migration, it makes sense to include people who are forced to migrate, but stay within 
the borders of the country of origin. Contrary to Schmeidl (1997) who looked at refugee 
emigration, Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003) analyze net migration defined as refugees 
leaving the country plus IDPs minus refugees from other countries. As a methodological 
advancement, they use a fixed effects estimator, which ensures unbiasedness of the estimated 
coefficients even if the explanatory variables are correlated with unobserved time-invariant 
country-specific fixed effects. 
Similar to Schmeidl (1997), Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003) find that measures of civil 
war, genocide/politicide and the lagged stock of refugees are highly significant predictors of 
refugee flows. In addition, they find that dissident violence short of outright civil war also 
represents a cause of forced migration. At the same time, they find interstate war to be highly 
insignificant. This is contrary to Schmeidl’s suggestion that interstate wars create IDPs rather 
than refugees, since the former are included in Davenport, Moore and Poe’s (2003) analysis. 
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poverty, they find it to be highly insignificant. Interestingly, autocratic regimes also do not 
create more or less refugees than democracies once other factors are controlled for, 
confirming the result by Schmeidl (1997), but changes in the regime of a country are 
associated with higher refugee flows. 
Moore and Shellman (2003) extend the analysis of Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003) to 
the period 1964 to 1995. Like Davenport, Moore and Poe, they also find that both state-
executed violence as well as violence ordained by dissident groups are the main causes of 
forced migration. The same is true for human rights abuses. Contrary to both Schmeidl 
(1997) and Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003), a higher average income level as measured by 
GNP per capita is associated with higher flows of refugees and IDPs. However, in comparing 
how a change from minimum to maximum value of independent variables changes the 
expected number of forced migrants, they find that GNP per capita is a substantively 
unimportant variable relative to the measures of violence and human rights abuse. To sum up, 
existing quantitative studies of the causes of flows of refugees and IDPs find that political 
violence and civil war are the main reasons why people flee. These findings are buttressed by 
more qualitative analyses – see, for example, Cohen and Deng (1998) and the references cited 
therein. 
With respect to asylum migration, only a few quantitative studies exist. Vogler and Rotte 
(2000) extend earlier work by Rotte, Vogler and Zimmermann (1997) to asylum migration 
from 86 Asian and African countries to Germany over the period 1981 to 1995 using fixed 
effects estimation. They find the predicted bell-shaped relationship with income per capita 
and a negative effect of economic growth on asylum migration, measured as asylum seekers 
divided by the population of the country of origin. Human rights violations have a positive 
effect on migration. Political regime type (democracy versus autocracy) either does not 
12 
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positive effect is also found for the urbanization rate. Existing immigration groups attract 
greater asylum flows. German aid flows to source countries do not matter, whereas trade flow 
coefficients are significant, but with an unexpected negative sign. 
Holzer, Schneider and Casey (2002) analyze the combined number of asylum seekers 
over the period 1990 to 1995 in Germany and Switzerland, using a negative binomial 
regression technique in a cross-sectional sample.
10 Referring to their general model, they find 
that poorer countries with higher infant mortality rates send more asylum seekers. Human 
rights violations exert a positive effect on asylum migration as do geographical closeness and 
existing migrant groups. A dummy for violent conflict as well as a variable measuring the 
number of war deaths turn out to be highly insignificant, however. 
Summing up, in comparison to the studies looking at refugees and IDPs in developing 
countries, the studies addressing asylum migration to developed countries indicate that 
economic factors are more important determinants of migration. This is not surprising given 
that the developed destination countries are much richer than their developing country 
counterparts. Where included, the political regime and violent political conflict do not matter, 
but human rights violations do. 
To our knowledge, there does not exist any quantitative study of the determinants of 
asylum migration to developed country destinations other than Germany and Switzerland. 
Our study aspires to fill this gap. In covering all Western European destination countries we 
cover flows of asylum migration more comprehensively, also accounting for the fact that 
                                                 
10 An earlier paper by Holzer, Schneider and Widmer (2000b) uses time-series analysis to show that legislative 
deterrence measures reduced the inflow of asylum seekers to Switzerland over the period 1986 to 1995, but 
were unsuccessful in the face of very strong push factors in nearby regions, for example, the civil war in the 
former Yugoslavian republics. 
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measures. In addition, we test a more comprehensive range of potential determinants of 
asylum migration. In particular, we want to find out whether the political regime and the 




The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable (ASYLUM) is the annual number of asylum seekers in Western 
European countries by country of origin over the period 1982 to 1999, as published by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2001).
11 The data go back to 
1980, but we lose the first two years since some of our independent variables are lagged. 
Western Europe refers to the 15 EU member countries plus Norway and Switzerland. 
Countries of origin are in principle all developing countries, that is all countries other than 
Western Europe, Northern America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, which naturally are 
not countries of origin themselves. However, missing data on some of the explanatory 
variables leads to a sample of 127 developing countries, which together account for around 
85 per cent of all asylum seekers in Western Europe. 
The applications generally refer to the number of applicants or persons rather than the 
number of applications or families and exclude repeat or appeal applications. We focus on 
asylum application in Western European countries mainly for reasons of better data 
availability. The UNHCR does not provide information on asylum applications by country of 
origin in the United States before 1987, in Canada before 1989 and in Australia, New 
Zealand and Japan before 1996. Data from European countries other than the Western 
                                                 
11 Figures below five are not available and were coded as zero in our sample. 
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asylum applications amounting to about 72 per cent of all applications lodged in developed 
countries over the period 1980 to 1999 (see table 1 above), our dependent variable captures 
the main flows of asylum seeking. Only those persons who have officially filed a formal 
request for asylum are included. Other refugees who, for whatever reason, are either 
unwilling or unable to file an asylum request and illegal immigrants are not included.
12 
Practically no statistical information exists for these other refugees and illegal immigrants. 
 
The Independent Variables 
We need to ensure that our empirical model captures the complexity of likely causes of 
asylum migration. Faced with the paucity of data on unemployment rates and real wages, we 
resort to taking the GDP per capita in purchasing power parity and constant US$ of 1997 
(GDP) as our variable representing the economic incentive for migration. The data are taken 
from World Bank (2001) as the primary source and from WHO (2000) as supplementary 
source. In accordance with our theoretical considerations, we pre-tested for a non-linear 
effect of economic development on migration flows. However, we found no evidence for 
such an effect and therefore excluded the squared term from the main estimations reported 
below. We also include the average annual growth rate over the last three years (GROWTH) 
as another measure of economic hardship since average living standards typically deteriorate 
in times of economic crisis, independently of the income level. In addition, we included an 
index of economic discrimination against ethnic minorities (ECONDISCRIMINATION) from 
the Minorities at Risk dataset, which codes the severity of discrimination on a 0 to 4 scale 
(CIDCM, 2002). This index was multiplied by the population share of the minority 
                                                 
12 For example, before 1991 it was not possible for persons from non-European countries to apply for asylum in 
Italy. 
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discrimination indices was taken. To capture the effect that people in their working age are 
more likely to migrate, we include the share of 15 to 64 year olds among the total population 
in the country of origin (%POP15-64) (World Bank, 2001). 
To measure political oppression we constructed an autocracy variable as the unweighted 
sum of the political rights and civil liberties index (AUTOCRACY) published by Freedom 
House (2002). In this source, political rights refer to, for example, the freedom to organize in 
political parties or groupings, the existence of party competition and an effective opposition 
as well as the existence and fairness of elections including the possibility of taking power via 
those elections. Civil liberties refer to, for example, the freedom of the media, the right to 
open and free discussion, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of religious expression, the 
protection from political terror and the prevalence of the rule of law. The two indices are 
based on surveys among experts assessing the extent to which a country effectively respects 
political rights and civil liberties, both measured on a 1 (best) to 7 (worst) scale. In 
accordance with our theoretical considerations, we pre-tested for a non-linear effect of 
autocracy on asylum migration. There is some weak evidence for such an effect in the results 
reported below. 
Using Freedom House data over a period of time is not unproblematic since the scale, 
with which countries are judged changes slightly over time and it is not designed as a series. 
The Polity data for measuring democracy do not suffer from this problem, but since they are 
available for fewer countries than Freedom House data, they are used here only in sensitivity 
analysis (POLITY) (Gurr and Jaggers, 2000). 
As a measure of human rights violations (RIGHTSVIOLATION), we use the two Purdue 
Political Terror Scales (PTS) in accordance with many studies of refugee flows in the 
developing world (Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2003). One of the 
16 
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annual human rights reports to a scale from 1 (best) to 5 (worst). Analogously, the other scale 
is based upon information from the US Department of State’s Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices. The simple average of the two scales was used for the present study. If one 
index was unavailable for a particular year, the other one available was substituted for the 
aggregate index (data from Gibney, 2002). 
Following Moore and Shellman’s (2003) study, in order to measure threats to personal 
security from violent dissident political activity, we take the sum of guerrilla and riot events 
from Arthur Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (DISSIDENTVIOLENCE). 
The major disadvantage of the Banks’ violent events count data is that they do not measure 
the intensity of violence other than by the number of violent events occurring. However, we 
have no other measure available. Another disadvantage is that the Archive is commercially 
marketed and not freely accessible. Its data were collected as part of the US State Failure 
Task Force Project and have been published by King and Zeng (2001), but only up until 
1995. We therefore include this variable only in additional model estimations to avoid the 
loss of four years of observations. 
Threats to personal integrity stemming from events of civil and ethnic wars as well as the 
collapse of state authority (DOMWAR/STATEFAIL) are measured by the maximum of 
magnitude scores, each measured on a zero to four scale, as coded for such events by the US 
State Failure Task Force Project. For civil and ethnic wars the magnitude refers to the portion 
of a country affected by fighting, whereas for state failure the magnitude refers to the extent 
of failure of state authority (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2002). In addition, we use a magnitude 
score measuring the annual number of deaths from genocide and politicide 
17 
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13 Genocide and politicide are defined as the 
calculated physical destruction of a communal or political group in whole or part. 
With respect to interstate war, we wondered whether the fact that existing refugee studies 
find this variable to be insignificant might be due to the high threshold of 1000 battle deaths 
used for coding a conflict as interstate war in the commonly used Correlates of War data set 
(Singer, 2003). We therefore constructed a variable measuring the extent of external armed 
conflict (EXTERNALWAR) based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (Gleditsch 
et al., 2002). The variable is coded as zero if there was no armed conflict on the territory of a 
country. It is coded as one if there was a minor armed conflict, defined as any type of armed 
conflict resulting in more than 25 but less than 1000 casualties in any one year. The variable 
was coded as two if the conflict was of intermediate nature, defined as at least 25 but less 
than 1000 casualties in any one year in addition to an accumulated total of at least 1000 
deaths. Three is the code for large conflicts, which require more than 1000 battle deaths in a 
single year to qualify. Note that the reference point for coding is whether the conflict takes 
place on the territory of a country. A conflict is not coded for a country participating in a 
conflict outside its own territory as this cannot be expected to create refugees in this country. 
To measure the threat coming from natural disasters to people’s personal integrity, we 
constructed a variable counting the total aggregate number of deaths from droughts, 
earthquakes, epidemics, extreme temperatures, insect infestations, floods, earth slides, 
volcano eruptions, sea waves and surges, wild fires and wind storms (NATURALDISASTER) 
(CRED, 2002). To test for the effect of famines and food insecurity on asylum migration, we 
take net per capita food production (FOOD), indexed with base years 1989 to 1991, as our 
proxy variable (FAO, 2003). 
                                                 
13 We add 0.5 to the original score to distinguish the absence of such events from the presence of such events 
with an annual number of deaths of less than 300. 
18 
This version: May 2004To see whether cultural similarity is a facilitating factor lowering the costs of migration, 
we included the percentage of Christians in the country of origin (%CHRIST) (La Porta et al., 
2001). Aid and trade in per cent of GDP (AID and TRADE) as well as the number of tourist 
arrivals (TOURISTS) in the country of origin are taken to test for whether the extent of casual 
contact with the outside world has a significant impact upon flows of asylum seeking (World 
Bank, 2001 and WTO, 2002). We interpolate these data for missing years to avoid further 
reductions in sample size. 
To test for the colonial link effect, we included the number of years between 1900 and 
1960 a country has been a former colony of any European destination country (COLONY) 
(Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Another important facilitating factor is geographical proximity. 
The closer a country of origin is to Western Europe, the easier it is to reach these countries 
and file an asylum application. We capture this by the minimum air distance between the 
capital city of the country of origin and the capital city of the closest Western European 
country (DISTANCE) (Bennett and Stam, 2001). 
The presence of so-called migration networks is commonly regarded as an important 
facilitator (Böcker, 1998). Unfortunately, we were not able to find reliable data on the size of 
communities from origin countries in Western European destination countries. We therefore 
take the moving sum of asylum applicants from the prior five to two years as our proxy of 
migration networks (ASYLUMSTOCK).
14 
Other potentially important deterrents, which we could not take into account due to lack 
of data include visa requirements, asylum procedures and recognition rates, regulations with 
regard to welfare benefits and working rights of asylum seekers, forced removal and 
repatriation rates etc. In as much as they apply to asylum seekers from all countries similarly, 
                                                 
14 At the start of the panel this variable goes back fewer years to avoid a five year loss of observations. 
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section below). 
Finally, we include population size (POPULATION) as a control variable since countries 
of origin with a greater population size might also send more asylum seekers to EU countries, 
all other things equal. Also, people living in cities are likely to be better informed about 
migration possibilities and are more footloose. We therefore include the urbanization rate 
(%URBAN). Data for both variables are taken from World Bank (2001). 
We log those explanatory variables which are strictly positive and for which an elasticity 
interpretation of their coefficients makes sense in the estimations in which the dependent 
variable is also logged, namely the asylum stock, population, income and minimum distance 
variables.
15 Table 2 presents some summary information on all variables. Variance inflation 
factors were computed to check for multicollinearity. The factors for all individual variables 
are below 5 with the mean value below 2. There is therefore no reason to be concerned about 
multicollinearity. 
< Table 2 about here > 
Estimation Technique 
We estimate the following model 
 










The subscript i represents each country of origin in year t, y is the number of people filing 
for asylum. The second term on the right-hand side is the ASYLUMSTOCK variable, on 
which more below. The vector x contains the other explanatory variables. The (T-1) year-
                                                 
15 The results of our analysis would not be dramatically different if these variables were not logged. 
20 
This version: May 2004specific dummy variables D capture general developments such as lower transportation costs 
and tighter communication links, which facilitate the search for asylum for individuals in all 
countries of origin (UNHCR, 2000). Similarly, they control for a potential increase in asylum 
migration following restrictions on legal economic migration and family reunification. They 
also capture policy measures to reduce the number of asylum seekers, such as visa 
restrictions, sanctions for carriers, the benefits for and general accommodation conditions of 
asylum seekers and the like to the extent that these policy measures apply to all countries of 
origin equally. Their inclusion is important as these policy measures are difficult, if not 
impossible, to quantify. The ui represent individual unobserved or latent country effects. 
These capture time-invariant characteristics of countries of origin that are either not 
measurable or not captured by our explanatory variables. The vit is a stochastic error term. 
We first estimate (1) with fixed effects (FE). We employ standard errors that are fully 
robust and adjusted for the clustering of observations, i.e. observations are merely assumed to 
be independent across countries, but not necessarily within countries. The FE estimator 
subtracts from the equation to be estimated the over time average of the equation for each 
country. Because of this so-called within transformation the individual country effects ui are 
wiped out and the coefficients are estimated based on the time variation within each cross-
sectional unit only. Any correlation of the fixed effects with the explanatory variables is 
therefore rendered unproblematic. Unfortunately, by definition the FE estimator cannot 
estimate time-invariant explanatory variables. We therefore also estimate (1) with a 
population-averaged generalized estimating equation (GEE) estimator with an assumed 
Gaussian distribution of the dependent variable. The GEE estimator is asymptotically 
equivalent to a random-effects estimator, but additionally allows standard errors to be 
adjusted for clustering. For both estimators, the dependent variable is logged in order to 
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values.
16 
The second term on the right-hand side variable, ASYLUMSTOCK, is similar to a lagged 
dependent variable. However, we take the sum of the past five to two year dependent variable 
rather than the simple one-year lag of the dependent variable for two reasons. One is to 
average out coincidental temporary ups and downs and to capture the more long-term 
presence of groups of asylum seekers from specific countries of origin. Hence, whilst the 
dependent variable is a flow, ASYLUMSTOCK is a stock variable as its name suggests. 
Second, the value of the immediately preceding year is left out to mitigate correlation of the 
variable with the error term. The reason is that correlation of one of the regressors with the 
error term leads to bias in OLS estimation results. To avoid this bias one would need to 
employ a dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. However, this 
estimator requires the use of instrumental variables in the form of lags. Such a procedure 
always leads to a loss of efficiency in estimation. The researcher is therefore faced with a 
trade-off between a bias in FE estimation and loss of efficiency in 2SLS or GMM estimation. 
We decided to live with the fact that our estimations are potentially slightly biased and 
mitigate the problem by excluding the immediately preceding value from ASYLUMSTOCK. 
Also, the bias becomes smaller with rising T and the time dimension of our panel is higher 
than in many other panels where T can be as small as two or three. 
 
                                                 
16 Such a procedure can be problematic, as shown by King (1989) who suggests using special regression 
techniques for count data, that is for discrete, strictly positive data with typically a substantial share of values of 
zero. In sensitivity analysis, we used a population-averaged GEE estimator with a negative binomial distribution 
of the dependent variable. Results are broadly in line with those reported below suggesting that the estimators 
used do not unduly bias the results. 
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Column I of table 3 reports FE estimation results for the base model. Column II reports GEE 
estimation results, where we can now also add the time-invariant distance, colonial 
experience and religious similarity variables. In column III we add the dissident violent event 
count variable, which is unavailable after 1995 and therefore reduces the sample size 
considerably. In column IV we further add the aid, trade and tourism variables, which have 
lower availability and reduce the sample size considerably. Column V reports results from the 
Negative Binomial Regression Model with the same independent variables as in column II. 
< Table 3 about here > 
Starting with column I, the lagged sum of asylum flows is highly significant, supporting 
the hypothesis of migration networks. All three economic variables are statistically 
significant with the expected sign: higher income and economic growth lower, whereas 
greater economic discrimination against ethnic minorities raises asylum migration. The share 
of people in their working age is insignificant, however. With respect to political variables, 
autocracy has the expected bell-shaped impact as greater autocracy first increases and then 
lowers asylum migration. Not all threats to personal integrity are statistically significant. 
Threats that stem from human rights violations and civil and ethnic wars or the collapse of 
state authority are positively associated with asylum flows. In contrast, neither 
genocide/politicide nor external armed conflict are statistically significant. The same is true 
for threats to personal integrity stemming from natural disasters and food shortages. None of 
our two control variables – population size and urbanization rate – are statistically significant. 
Results from GEE estimation for the economic and threat to personal security variables 
are very similar to those from FE estimation. The only difference is that the external conflict 
variable becomes marginally significant at the .1 level with the expected positive sign. Both 
population size and the share of people in their working age now become significant with the 
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variables over time, which results in large standard errors in FE estimation results due to 
inefficient within-time estimation. However, the urbanization rate, which also varies little 
over time, remains insignificant as before. As concerns our newly added time-invariant 
variables, distance is a statistically significant deterrent. Neither religious similarity nor 
former colonial experience appear to matter, however. Results are hardly affected if 
DISSIDENTVIOLENCE is added in column III. Events of dissident violence are positively 
associated with asylum seeking as expected. If anything, former colonies send fewer asylum 
seekers to Western Europe. 
The aid, trade and tourism arrival variables are added to GEE estimation in column IV. 
Neither aid nor trade are significant and if anything a higher inflow of tourists is associated 
with smaller numbers of asylum seekers. Results for the other variables are very similar in 
terms of sign and statistical significance of coefficients. The main difference is that there is 
no longer a non-linear effect of autocracy. The squared term was insignificant and the 
reported results therefore refer to the model with the linear term only. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
In sensitivity analysis, we tested the effect of outliers on our estimation results. Due to space 
constraints, we merely describe, but no longer report, the detailed results here. To start with, 
we took all countries from the former Yugoslavia out of the sample. This is due to the 
extraordinarily high influx of people from these countries fleeing to Western Europe in the 
early to mid-1990s. Our results are hardly affected by their exclusion. This could at least 
partly be due to the fact that Western European governments faced with a large-scale influx 
of asylum seekers from these countries took them out of the normal system based on 
individual decision of asylum claims and provided them with temporary group protection 
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have both high residuals and a high leverage (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980). The criterion 
is to exclude an observation if its so-called DFITS is greater than twice the square root of 
(k/n), where k is the number of independent variables and n the number of observations. 
DFITS is defined as the square root of (hi/(1-hi)), where hi is an observation’s leverage, 
multiplied by its studentized residual. Applying this criterion leads to the exclusion of 106 
observations. Results are not much affected, however. 
Given low life expectancy in developing countries, one might wonder whether the 
population share of people aged 15 to 44 is more relevant than the share of people aged 15 to 
64 used in the estimations above. However, this alternative measure of demographic 
composition in origin countries is insignificant throughout. Does economic inequality in 
sending countries matter? If we include the Gini coefficient in the estimations, then the 
number of observations drops dramatically and the coefficient itself is statistically 
insignificant. This could be due to the poor quality of cross-national data on income 
inequality, however. 
Instead of the food supply variable, we tested the daily calorie intake as a different proxy 
for famine and hunger, without affecting the statistical insignificance of this variable. Instead 
of the continuous variable counting the number of deaths from natural disasters we created a 
dummy variable capturing disasters with a threshold of 1000 deaths. Again, the variable 
remained insignificant. When we replaced the AUTOCRACY variable from Freedom House 
with the POLITY measure, which has poorer data availability but is more consistent in its 
definition across time as discussed above, then the non-linear effect is no longer apparent and 
greater autocracy linearly raises the number of people seeking asylum in Western Europe. 
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Our results suggest a complex mix of determinants of asylum migration. There is clear 
evidence that economic factors matter. The estimated elasticity of average per capita income 
is almost unitary in column I of table 3, suggesting that a 1 per cent increase in income is 
associated with a 1 per cent decrease in the number of asylum seekers. A one percentage 
point lower economic growth rate raises the number of asylum seekers by about 0.02 per 
cent. Whilst this is small, economic growth also has an indirect effect via raising the level of 
income. A one per cent increase in the number of existing asylum seekers in the recent past 
raises the number of asylum seekers by a relatively small 0.09 per cent. A one per cent 
increase in the distance to Western Europe lowers the number of asylum seekers by 1.33 per 
cent (column II of table 3). More populous countries send more asylum seekers, but not 
proportional to their population size as the estimated elasticity is substantially below unity. 
The coefficients of the other variables are more difficult to interpret. Variables are measured 
in different units and have different distributions, which is why the estimated coefficients 
cannot be compared directly with each other. Taking a one standard deviation increase in a 
variable to represent a ‘substantial’ increase, table 4 shows the percentage increase in asylum 
seekers following a substantial increase in an explanatory variable.
17 It clearly shows that the 
impact of changes in the economic variables and in existing asylum networks are 
substantively important. However, the substantive importance of human rights violations, 
dissident violence, ethnic/civil war and state failure as well as external conflict are not 
negligible either. Note that due to the non-linear effect of AUTOCRACY the estimated 
percentage increase following a one standard deviation increase in this variable depends of 
course on the initial value of the variable. An increase from one standard deviation below the 
mean towards the mean increases the number of asylum seekers by more than 133 per cent. 
                                                 
17 We list only variables with statistically significant coefficients in column III of table 3 to which results refer. 
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number of asylum seekers can be estimated as (-δ/2φ), where δ is the coefficient of the 
autocracy variable and φ the coefficient of the squared term. The estimated turning point for 
the Freedom House index, which runs from 2 to 14, is about 13.1 in column I, 13.5 in column 
II and 11.8 in column III. In other words, only in the most restrictive autocracies can the 
limitations typically imposed on emigration in such regimes be expected to outweigh the 
incentive to migrate away from political repression. 
< Table 4 about here > 
What accounts for the fact that the genocide/politicide, famine and natural disaster 
variables all turn out to be insignificant? One explanation is that people fleeing from these 
events are likely to remain in neighboring developing countries and/or become IDPs within 
their own country, which is why studies looking at refugee and IDP flows in developing 
countries find them to be statistically significant, particularly the genocide/politicide variable. 
Another explanation could be that these tend to be short-term and one-off events. In contrast, 
poverty, economic discrimination against ethnic minorities, human rights violations, 
autocratic regime and even civil/ethnic warfare are more persistent events. Given that 
migration to Western Europe probably requires some planning and preparation we are not 
surprised to find that factors to which people are exposed to more persistently over time are 
more significant determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe than short-term and 
one-off events. This might even explain the fact that we find only some evidence that external 
armed conflict matters. Such conflicts are not only very infrequent compared to ethnic/civil 
war and state failure, but they also tend to have a short duration (Slantchev, 2003). 
The insignificance of colonial ties is a rather striking result. These ties influence the 
specific country in which asylum seekers coming to Western Europe will settle (Böcker, 
1998; Neumayer 2004a), but former European colonies do not send more asylum seekers into 
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studies examining the specific destination choice within the EU (ibid.). The same is true for 
any potential contact established by aid, trade or flows of tourism. These are likely to be far 
too casual to have a significant impact upon asylum migration. Like other studies, we find 




Are asylum seekers in Western Europe economic migrants or ‘genuine’ refugees? As our 
analysis is at the aggregate level, we can say nothing definite about individuals. What we can 
say is that economic conditions in countries of origin are statistically significant and 
substantively important determinants of aggregate numbers of asylum seekers coming to 
Western Europe. This implies that policies aimed at improving economic conditions in these 
countries, such as generous development assistance and the opening of protected European 
markets to imports from developing countries, can lower the migration pressure from these 
countries. The pressure on Western Europe will remain as long as income levels are so 
widely different. Indeed, the divergence in income levels means that the pressure is bound to 
increase further (Cole and Neumayer, 2003). We find no evidence for a bell-shaped effect of 
income levels in origin countries on asylum flows, the so-called migration hump, and 
therefore reject the suggestion that ‘poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing 
strategy’ (Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen, 2002:35) or is so only in the 
long-run (Rotte, Vogler and Zimmermann, 1997). 
At the same time, our results clearly demonstrate the importance of the political regime in 
origin countries and of threats to the personal integrity of individuals from human rights 
abuse, dissident political violence, civil/ethnic warfare and state failure as well as possibly 
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developing world as identified by the studies of, for example, Schmeidl (1997), Davenport, 
Moore and Poe (2003) as well as Moore and Shellman (2003) are also major determinants of 
asylum migration to developed countries. It also suggests that the few existing studies of 
asylum migration to single European countries such as Vogler and Rotte (2000), Rotte, 
Vogler and Zimmermann (1997) as well as Holzer, Schneider and Casey (2002) might have 
under-estimated or not fully captured the effect of violent political conflict in origin countries 
on asylum migration. In comparison, this study includes a more comprehensive set of 
variables covering various aspects of political violence. With respect to regime type, our 
results contradict the findings of Vogler and Rotte (2000), Rotte, Vogler and Zimmermann 
(1997) and some of the studies of refugee flows in the developing world. The lack of 
democracy increases asylum migration in our estimations, but often in a non-linear way, 
which is not allowed for in these studies and which might partly explain the difference in 
results. With respect to the asylum migration studies, another reason could be that our 
research design includes all developing countries of origin, not just those from Africa and 
Asia. Also, we analyze asylum migration to Western Europe rather than one single 
destination country. However, the latter is not decisive since in non-reported sensitivity 
analysis we restricted the estimations to asylum migration to Germany (rather than Western 
Europe) which confirmed our results. 
More importantly, our results put the perception that aggregate numbers of asylum 
seekers coming to Western Europe are merely determined by economic conditions in the 
countries of origin into great doubt. The spread of democracy around the world can be 
expected to lower the number of people seeking asylum, but no such positive worldwide 
trend is apparent in terms of violent political conflict and human rights violations. Again, 
Western Europe can contribute to mitigating asylum migration pressure if its policies help to 
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events from occurring then it will have to face the migration pressure. The conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia with its hundreds of thousands of people fleeing to Western Europe 
represent a stark warning. It is only recently that the EU has recognized the need for a 
‘comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development 
issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, 
improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating 
democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights…’ (European Council, 1999: 
para.11).
18 It has yet to prove that this commitment is real and not merely something reserved 
to non-binding declarations of good will (Boswell, 2003). 
Of course, economic factors cannot be cleanly separated from others. For example, 
persistent episodes of conflict and violence can increase economic hardship in countries of 
origin. Also, those fleeing from persecution and violence might also seek better economic 
conditions in the country of destination. Lower travel costs have made it easier for people to 
flee to Western developed countries instead of seeking refuge in neighboring equally poor 
developing countries. Theory predicts that even those fleeing from persecution will naturally 
prefer to migrate to developed countries if given a choice. The UNHCR argues that ‘many 
people leave their home countries for a combination of political, economic and other reasons. 
This mixture of motives is one factor creating a perception of widespread abuse of asylum 
systems, which is often manipulated by politicians and the media’ (UNHCR, 2000:155). 
One of the problems is that some of the non-economic determinants of asylum migration 
such as dissident violence, ethnic/civil war, state failure and repressive political conditions 
are often not recognized as valid grounds for granting full asylum status in many Western 
European countries. For example, Germany tends to refuse asylum to those applicants 
                                                 
18 Similarly, European Council (2002). 
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(ibid.: 163). Many more do not recognize generalized threats, for which it is difficult to prove 
that they have been directed specifically against an individual. A Joint Position Paper of the 
Council of the European Union states that ‘reference to a civil war or internal or generalized 
armed conflict and the dangers which it entails is not in itself sufficient to warrant the grant 
of refugee status. Fear of persecution must in all cases (…) be individual in nature’ (European 
Council, 1996:para. 6). Asylum seekers falling into this category have typically not been 
granted full asylum recognition, but have still been allowed to remain in the country on 
humanitarian grounds. The resulting low recognition rates for full asylum status in turn is 
likely to foster the public perception of large-scale abuse of seemingly generous asylum 
provisions by ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. There is therefore a case for broadening the 
definitional scope for the grounds establishing valid claims for asylum to include these other 
threats to personal integrity. 
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Total 233.6  793.8  1495.6  3373.3  2751.7  16829.0 
Western Europe, of which  215.2  570.6  1105.7  2586.0  1783.9  12092.8 
   France  40.4  106.3  178.6  184.5  112.2  1163.7 
   Germany  121.7  249.6  455.2  1337.1  542.4  5169.0 
   United Kingdom  3.3  17.4  28.5  150.8  223.2  840.2 
Northern  America  18.1  201.1 368.9 673.6 773.2  4034.1 
 
Source: UNHCR, Asylum Applications in Industrialized Countries: 1980-1999 (Geneva: 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2001). 
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Variable  Obs  Mean     Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
ln ASYLUM  2046  4.51 3.25 0 12.30 
ASYLUM 2046  2427.59 9169.76 0 219741 
ln ASYLUMSTOCK  2046  15.13 12.61 0 46.33 
ln GDP  2046  7.91 0.91 6.08 10.42 
GROWTH 2046  -0.07 5.50 -26.17 37.66 
%POP15-64 2046  56.98 5.93 45.32 72.65 
ECONDISCRIMINATION 2046  0.31 0.57 0 3.39 
AUTOCRACY 2046  9.25 3.41 2 14 
RIGHTSVIOLATION 2046  2.81 1.03 1 5 
DISSIDENTVIOLENCE 1461 0.79 2.15 0 27 
DOMWAR/STATEFAIL 2046  0.64 1.23 0 5 
GEN/POLITICIDE 2046  0.15 0.73 0 5.5 
EXTERNALWAR 2046  0.11 0.53 0 3 
FOOD 2046  99.11 17.98 33 216.8 
NATURALDISASTER 2046  370.50 4135.46 0 142169 
ln POPULATION  2046  16.00 1.60 11.09 20.95 
%URBAN 2046  44.91 22.72 4.1 100 
ln DISTANCE  2046  7.90 0.79 5.72 9.29 
%CHRIST 2046  37.77 38.22 0 99.1 
COLONY 2046  28.90 27.70 0 60 
AID 1836  8.57 13.97 0 210.49 
TRADE 1874  70.17 46.52 1.41 406.75 
TOURISTS 1832  1465.98 3318.21 0 27047 
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 I  II  III  IV 
Estimation  technique  FE  GEE GEE GEE 
Dependent variable  ln ASYLUM  ln ASYLUM  ln ASYLUM  ln ASYLUM 
ln ASYLUMSTOCK  0.090  0.106  0.082  0.093 
  (11.78)*** (18.21)*** (11.84)*** (12.08)*** 
ln  GDP  -1.021 -0.923 -0.858 -0.668 
 (2.47)**  (4.06)***  (3.12)***  (1.98)** 
GROWTH  -0.023 -0.025 -0.023 -0.026 
 (2.23)**  (2.61)***  (2.24)***  (2.43)** 
ECONDISCRIMATION 0.383  0.342  0.401  0.288 
 (2.28)**  (2.77)***  (2.98)***  (1.79)* 
%POP15-64 0.032  0.050  0.053  0.074 
 (0.82)  (2.17)**  (1.72)*  (2.33)** 
AUTOCRACY 0.387  0.350  0.494  0.137 
  (2.55)**  (2.67)*** (3.11)*** (3.88)*** 
(AUTOCRACY)
2 -0.015  -0.013  -0.021   
 (1.69)*  (1.77)*  (2.42)**   
RIGHTSVIOLATION 0.173  0.174  0.300  0.293 
  (2.49)**  (2.70)*** (4.73)*** (4.12)*** 
DISSIDENTVIOLENCE     0.049  0.058 
     (2.58)***  (2.83)*** 
DOMWAR/STATEFAIL 0.128  0.124  0.116  0.114 
 (2.52)**  (2.66)***  (2.21)**  (1.93)* 
GEN/POLITICIDE 0.008  -0.003  -0.006  0.014 
  (0.16) (0.08) (0.12) (0.21) 
EXTERNALWAR 0.071  0.111  0.204  0.225 
 (0.99)  (1.65)*  (2.84)***  (1.78)* 
FOOD  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.17) (0.25) (0.36) (0.26) 
NATURALDISASTER -0.000 -0.000 0.000  0.000 
  (0.33) (0.37) (0.31) (0.43) 
ln POPULATION  0.338  0.344  0.388  0.433 
  (0.35)  (5.03)*** (4.16)*** (3.96)*** 
%URBAN 0.008  0.008  0.006  0.002 
  (0.35) (1.03) (0.73) (0.18) 
ln  DISTANCE    -1.332 -1.603 -1.582 
    (9.67)*** (9.59)*** (8.87)*** 
%CHRIST   -0.001  0.000  -0.001 
    (0.30) (0.09) (0.32) 
COLONY    -0.005 -0.006 -0.010 
   (1.25)  (1.67)*  (1.88)* 
AID       0.011 
       (1.52) 
TRADE       -0.002 
       (0.99) 
TOURISTS       -0.000 
       (2.11)** 
Observations  2046 2046 1461 1156 
Countries 127  127  122  110 
 
Notes: Coefficients of year-specific dummy variables and constant not shown. Absolute t-
values or z-values in parentheses. Standard errors robust towards arbitrary autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity. Observations assumed to be independent across countries, but not 
within countries (clustering). * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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increase in an independent variable 
 
Variable %  increase
ln ASYLUMSTOCK  103.39










ln POPULATION  62.24
ln DISTANCE  -126.33
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